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Previous work has reported that it is not difficult to give people the illusion of ownership
over an artificial body, providing a powerful tool for the investigation of the neural and
cognitive mechanisms underlying body perception and self consciousness. We present
an experimental study that uses immersive virtual reality (IVR) focused on identifying the
perceptual building blocks of this illusion. We systematically manipulated visuotactile and
visual sensorimotor contingencies, visual perspective, and the appearance of the virtual
body in order to assess their relative role and mutual interaction. Consistent results from
subjective reports and physiological measures showed that a first person perspective
over a fake humanoid body is essential for eliciting a body ownership illusion. We found
that the illusion of ownership can be generated when the virtual body has a realistic
skin tone and spatially substitutes the real body seen from a first person perspective.
In this case there is no need for an additional contribution of congruent visuotactile or
sensorimotor cues. Additionally, we found that the processing of incongruent perceptual
cues can be modulated by the level of the illusion: when the illusion is strong, incongruent
cues are not experienced as incorrect. Participants exposed to asynchronous visuotactile
stimulation can experience the ownership illusion and perceive touch as originating from
an object seen to contact the virtual body. Analogously, when the level of realism of the
virtual body is not high enough and/or when there is no spatial overlap between the
two bodies, then the contribution of congruent multisensory and/or sensorimotor cues
is required for evoking the illusion. On the basis of these results and inspired by findings
from neurophysiological recordings in the monkey, we propose a model that accounts for
many of the results reported in the literature.
Keywords: perceptual illusions, full body ownership illusion, rubber hand illusion, out-of-body experiences,
multisensory integration, first person perspective, virtual reality
1. INTRODUCTION
The experience of our body results from the complex interplay
of various perceptual streams involving vision, touch, proprio-
ception, interoception, motor control, and vestibular sensations.
Strong evidence supporting this statement comes from a num-
ber of neurological conditions where the sense of the body
becomes altered as a consequence of focal brain lesions, limb
amputation or deafferentation. Examples of such conditions are
somatoparaphrenia and associated anosognosia (Berlucchi and
Aglioti, 1997, 2010; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009), phantom limb
sensations (Giummarra et al., 2007), and out-of-body experiences
(OBEs) (Blanke and Mohr, 2005).
Altered body perceptions analogous to those experienced in
lesioned patients, can be temporally induced in healthy sub-
jects in controlled experimental settings, where the delivery of
anomalous sensory stimuli is systematically manipulated. These
altered perceptual states are usually referred to as bodily illusions
and have been extensively used for studying body perception,
self-consciousness and their underlying neural correlates. In par-
ticular, experimentally controlled bodily illusions allow, to some
extent, the isolation of the various components that converge in
the holistic experience of our bodies.
In this paper we present a study that investigates the main per-
ceptual components of the full body ownership illusion, a specific
type of bodily illusion in which healthy subjects experience an
artificial body as if it were their own physical body. This illusion
is particularly interesting for the study of self-consciousness as it
relies on an altered representation of the entire body (Blanke and
Metzinger, 2009; Blanke, 2012) and, as such, it is complementary
to the “rubber hand illusion” (RHI) paradigm in the study of body
perception.
In the original version of the RHI (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998), participants see a rubber hand located in front of them
in a similar posture to their corresponding but hidden real hand.
Both rubber and real hands are stroked by the experimenter.
When the strokes on the real and rubber hands are delivered
synchronously and in the corresponding spatial locations, most
participants experience the rubber hand as if it were their own
and feel the touch as originating from the rubber hand itself;
the same does not happen, or to a much lesser extent, when
the stroking is asynchronous, or when there are other inconsis-
tencies (such as spatial) between the stroking on both hands. A
large number of studies have adapted and extended this classi-
cal set-up providing experimental evidence about the different
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perceptual components that contribute to the RHI. These include
the spatial configuration and appearance of the artificial hand
and the delivery of multisensory and/or sensorimotor stimula-
tion. The spatial configuration of the artificial hand with respect
to the real body affects the illusion. For example, the illusion
does not occur when anatomical constraints are violated: when
the rubber hand is located outside the participant’s peripersonal
space (e.g., Lloyd, 2007), when it is in impossible postures (e.g.,
Ehrsson, 2004; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), or when it does not
represent the main topological features of a hand (Tsakiris and
Haggard, 2005). In terms of perceptual cues, the spatial configu-
ration component corresponds to a stream of visuoproprioceptive
information in which the spatial location encoded by vision is
compared with the one encoded by proprioception. The body’s
spatial location encoded by proprioception can be altered, so that
it does not always coincide with the position of the physical body.
This happens in RHI experiments, where the illusion is typically
associated with a mislocalization of the real hand toward the fake
hand. Inherent to the RHI paradigm is the delivery of visuotac-
tile stimulation, which has to be synchronous in order to evoke
the illusion. However, it has been shown that the illusion is also
experienced when visuotactile stimulation is substituted by other
modalities of multisensory and/or sensorimotor stimulation, e.g.,
with sensorimotor contingencies in active or passive movements
(Tsakiris et al., 2006; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). This shows that
the onset of the illusion is triggered more generally from a stream
of congruent multimodal bodily signals (multisensory or sensori-
motor) and does not necessarily require visuotactile integration.
Finally, visual appearance has been found to play a critical role in
the illusion: the fake hand does not need to be necessarily realistic
for the illusion to take place, as shown by the numerous reports
of ownership experienced over plastic-looking hands or elon-
gated limbs (Schaefer et al., 2007; Kilteni et al., 2012; Preston and
Newport, 2012); however, higher levels of realism of the artificial
hand, in terms of texture and shape, have been found to enhance
the strength of the illusion (Haans et al., 2008). The overall emerg-
ing scenario is that the sense of ownership over an external object
requires the convergence of two main sources of information:
(1) the on-line driving contribution from bottom–up processing
of congruent multimodal perceptual cues and (2) the modulat-
ing top–down machinery based on a flexible but still robust prior
internal body representation that requires that some key anatom-
ical constraints in terms of body shape and visual perspective are
preserved (see Graziano and Botvinik, 2002; Makin et al., 2008;
Tsakiris, 2010).
Analogous perceptual components have been identified for the
illusions of owning a whole artificial body. However, the relative
importance of each of these components and their mutual inter-
action are still a subject of debate. This is partly due to the fact that
different experimental procedures have been introduced to extend
the RHI for dealing with whole bodies. Two main set-ups have
been used and, interestingly, the illusions evoked in the two cases
were not the same. Both set-ups use a head-mounted-display
(HMD) to occlude the real body from vision and to display
the artificial body in stereo. In one case participants saw their
own body or that of a mannequin as filmed from 2m behind.
When exposed to synchronous stroking seen on the back of the
visualized body and felt on their own back, participants reported
experiencing the sensation of “seeing their own perceived body
from a distance” and of perceiving touch as originating from the
distant body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009; Aspell et al., 2009;
Ionta et al., 2011). Alternatively, when the stroking was felt on
the chest and seen from a first person perspective (i.e., the stick
seen as stroking the spatial location corresponding to that of the
real chest), the resulting illusion was characterized as a feeling
of having one’s own center of awareness moved behind the seen
body, to the first person perspective position fromwhere the scene
was being observed. The true body seen in front was perceived as
something like an “empty shell” or a “disowned body” (Ehrsson,
2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2009; Guterstam and Ehrsson, 2012).
Although the illusions experienced in these two cases are notably
different, they are both referred to as experimentally induced
OBEs. In a different experimental set-up, a mannequin (Petkova
and Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova et al., 2011) or a virtual body (Slater
et al., 2010) was displayed from a first person perspective (1PP),
where the artificial body visually substituted the obscured real
body. Synchronous stroking of the real and virtual bodies typ-
ically induces the illusion of owning the artificial body, which
is then perceived as the origin of sensory signals like touch and
vision. We refer to this as full body ownership illusion.
Two principal open issues emerge from the work so far on full
body illusions. These are the role of visual perspective and the
role of visuotactile stimulation. The role of visual perspective is
a key subject on which two major classes of results are diverg-
ing. Reports about the feeling of self-identification that occurs
during experimentally induced OBEs suggest that the sense of
ownership can be experienced over an artificial body seen from
a third person perspective (3PP) (Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009;
Aspell et al., 2009; Ionta et al., 2011). However, studies focusing
on the full body ownership illusion report that a 3PP over the arti-
ficial body does not result in the illusion even when synchronous
visuotactile stimulation is delivered (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008;
Slater et al., 2010; Petkova et al., 2011). The difference between
these findings could be ascribed to differences in the experimen-
tal designs adopted or alternatively to the fact that different kinds
of perceptual illusions are involved. The full body ownership illu-
sion experienced in 1PP is described as the feeling of owning an
artificial body, which substitutes the real body as the origin of
perceptual sensations. (e.g., Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Slater
et al., 2010). Experimentally induced OBEs have been charac-
terized in different ways according to the specific experimental
protocol adopted. Depending on the stroking mode, participants
have one of two different experiences: (1) the visual 1PP and
tactile sensations coincide in the same body—since there is the
sensation of being embodied behind the location of the real body
that is seen in front (chest stroking); (2) the visual 1PP and the
origin of tactile sensations are divorced, since the visual 1PP is
at the real body location, but tactile sensations are attributed to
the fake body that is seen in front (back stroking). For a com-
parative study see Lenggenhager et al. (2009). The latter illusion
has been shown to correlate with a recoding of self-location in
space as measured by walking responses (Lenggenhager et al.,
2007) and mental imagery (Lenggenhager et al., 2009), as well
as with a remapping of the spatial representation of visuotactile
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stimuli as measured by the crossmodal congruency effect (CCE;
Aspell et al., 2009). It has been further found to correspond
with the specific activation of a number of brain areas such as
the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), the bilateral premotor cor-
tex (PMC) and the medial sensorimotor cortex (Ionta et al.,
2011; Lenggenhager et al., 2011). Despite this, the possibility that
the sense of ownership and touch could be experienced over a
body located in the far extrapersonal space is still under discus-
sion. It has been proposed that self-identification during OBEs
is not an actual perceptual illusion, but rather a form of self-
recognition similar to the self-recognition of oneself in a mirror
(Petkova et al., 2011; Ehrsson, 2012). Whether the controversy
concerning the role played by visual perspective is grounded
in the very nature of the illusion or in uncertainties associ-
ated with the experimental set-ups adopted remains to be clearly
established.
The second main issue under debate concerns the role of
multisensory stimulation as a trigger to elicit the illusion. A con-
clusion drawn in most studies is that synchronous visuotactile
stimulation is necessary to elicit the illusion. This is the case for all
the OBE’s studies mentioned above. Petkova and Ehrsson (2008)
also reported that, together with a 1PP over a humanoid arti-
ficial body, synchronous visuotactile stimulation is necessary to
trigger the full body ownership illusion (see also, Petkova et al.,
2011). Using an immersive virtual reality (IVR) set-up, Slater et al.
(2010) came instead to a different conclusion. In their experiment
participants wore a tracked HMD, receiving visual sensorimotor
contingencies, meaning that the displayed field of view is con-
tinuously updated according to head position and orientation.
Additionally, a virtual mirror provided synchronous visual feed-
back of head movements (visuomotor correlations). Participants
received visuotactile stimulation either synchronously or asyn-
chronously, and in both cases they experienced a strong full body
ownership illusion. The fact that participants in this experiment
could experience the illusion even when receiving asynchronous
visuotactile stimulation seems to contradict the results of Petkova
and Ehrsson (2008). However, there are two main differences
between the two experimental set-ups. First, visual sensorimo-
tor contingencies were provided in the IVR experiment, while in
Petkova et al.’s experiment participants were exposed to a static
field of view and were asked not to move their head, which was
fixed looking down toward their body. Second, the virtual body
in the IVR experiment had a realistic human body appearance,
in term of skin texture and clothes, while in the other case the
artificial body was a plastic mannequin. Whether these differ-
ences could explain the different conclusions drawn from the two
experiments regarding the necessity or otherwise of visuotactile
stimulation, is still not clear.
In this paper we report a set of experiments that systematically
varies factors thought to contribute to the full body ownership
illusion. Specifically, we consider the effect of visuotactile correla-
tions and visual (head-based) sensorimotor contingencies, visual
perspective and visual appearance. Our main aim was to fit previ-
ous results into a common framework and to propose a model
that would allow assessment of the relative contributions and
reciprocal interactions of such bodily signals to the full body
ownership illusion.
2. MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
2.1. OVERALL DESIGN
Our study consisted of three experiments designed with the aim
of exploring and disentangling the relative role of those factors
that have been reported to be the building blocks of the full-
body illusion: visual perspective, human-like bodily appearance,
and visuotactile stimulation. Additionally, we consider the effects
visual sensorimotor contingencies provided by head tracking,
where the visual field displayed in the HMD is updated according
to the tracked movements of the participant’s head, in the same
way as it would be in physical reality.
In experiment 1 we examined the effects of visuotactile and
visual sensorimotor stimulation and their possible interaction.
For this experiment we used a between-groups 2 × 2 design
with two binary factors: visuotactile stimuli could be synchronous
(VT) or asynchronous (⊥VT); head tracking could be enabled
(HT) providing visual sensorimotor contingencies, or disabled
(¬HT), which is with no head movements and with a fixed field
of view, as in the set-up of Petkova and Ehrsson (2008). The
design of this first experiment was mainly driven by the attempt
to account for the difference in the results reported in Petkova
and Ehrsson (2008) and Slater et al. (2010), since one important
difference between the two studies concerns visual sensorimotor
contingencies that are provided in the latter, but not in the former.
Experiment 2 was designed to explicitly test the hypothesis that
visual perspective is a critical factor for the full body ownership
illusion. For this we adopted a single-factor design, perspective,
which had two levels (1PP vs. 3PP). Head tracking was set to HT
and visuotactile to VT. This was to examine the effect of perspec-
tive in the otherwise most favorable condition for the illusion,
i.e., with synchronous visuotactile stimulation and visual sensori-
motor contingencies. If 3PP prevents the illusion in this case, we
can safely extrapolate that the same will happen for other con-
figurations where at least one of the two stimulations is in an
incongruent mode (e.g., ⊥VT), or is not provided (e.g., ¬HT).
In experiment 3 we examine the impact of the level of real-
ism for the appearance of the artificial body, comparing the effect
of seeing a realistic human avatar (HA) vs. a plastic mannequin
avatar (MA). The hypothesis was that the level of realism of the
visualized body (in terms of skin texture and clothing) canmodu-
late the intensity of the full body ownership illusion. As in the case
of experiment 1, the design of this experiment has beenmotivated
by the second critical difference among the experimental set-ups
of Petkova and Ehrsson (2008) and Slater et al. (2010): the visual
appearance of the fake bodies. We employed a single-factor design
where the bodily appearance varied on two levels (HA vs. MA)
with the other factors in the [1PP,⊥VT,¬HT] configuration. This
choice enabled us to disentangle the hypothesized modulation of
the illusion intensity by the visual appearance of the artificial body
from the effects of multisensory and sensorimotor contingencies.
2.2. IMPLEMENTATION
The factors that were manipulated in the three experi-
ments are summarized in Table 1: visual perspective (1PP vs.
3PP), bodily appearance (HA vs. MA), visuotactile stimulation
(VT vs. ⊥VT), and visual sensorimotor stimulation from head
tracking (HT vs. ¬HT). Although all the four factors vary on
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two levels, the three experiments planned for this study involve in
total six conditions, as some factor combinations could be used
for more than one experiment.
When head tracking was enabled, participants could explore
the virtual environment and, looking down, they could see the
virtual body when in the 1PP condition. In the ¬HT condi-
tions the virtual scene was instead static and participants were
Table 1 | Combinations of experimental factors adopted for the three
experiments.
Factors Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Visuotactile VT vs. ⊥VT VT ⊥VT
Head tracking HT vs. ¬HT HT ¬HT
Visual perspective 1PP 1PP vs. 3PP 1PP
Body appearance HA HA HA vs. MA
All experimental factors vary on two levels: “visuotactile” could be synchronous
or asynchronous (VT vs. ⊥VT); “headtracking” could be enabled or disabled,
providing or not visual sensorymotor contingencies (HT vs. ¬HT); “visual per-
spective” could be first person or third person perspective (1PP vs. 3PP);
and “body appearance” could be either human or mannequin appearance
(HA vs. MA). The variables in orange show the levels of the experimental fac-
tors, while the ones in black show the fixed configuration adopted for each
experiment. There were nine participants in each of the four factorial cells of
experiment 1, another nine participants in the 3PP condition of experiment 2,
and another nine in the MA condition of experiment 3, resulting in a total of 54
participants.
instructed not to move their head and gaze direction, which was
fixed looking down toward the virtual body.
Figures 1A,B (1D,E) show the perspective levels for a female
(male) participant. For the case of 3PP, the point of view was
shifted horizontally 40 cm away to the right; head tracking
was enabled, so that participants could see the virtual body to
their left, in their near peripersonal space (i.e., within reach).
Participants in this condition also saw the avatar’s head moving
as their own while exploring the environment, which provided
them with additional visuomotor correlations. Note that since the
avatar’s head followed the movements of the participant’s head,
participants never got to see the avatar’s face (see Figures 1B,E).
The avatars used to test the role of the body visual appearance
are shown in Figures 1A,C (1D,F) for the case of a female (male)
participant.
The apparatus used to implement the visuotactile stimulation
is shown in Figure 2. Touch was delivered via mechanical vibra-
tors attached to a haptic vest, while the seen touch was provided
in the form of a ball bouncing on the virtual body along a pre-
recorded path. The location of the vibrators on the haptic vest was
adjusted for each participant, so as to match the contact points
of the ball’s pre-recorded trajectory with the chest of the avatar.
In the VT condition each vibrator was activated for a short time
interval (20ms) when the simulator detected a collision of the ball
with the avatar mesh in the corresponding point (Spanlang et al.,
2010; Pomes et al., 2012). The time delay of the vibrator activation
with respect to the virtual collision corresponds to the communi-
cation time between the machine running the IVR software and
FIGURE 1 | Perspective levels and body appearances levels used for
the different conditions of the experiments. Gender-matched avatars
were assigned to each participant. [A,B (D,E)] Show the two levels of the
factor “perspective” for a female (male) participant: in the 1PP conditions
(A,D,C,F) when looking down participants could see a virtual body
co-located with their own physical body, while in the 3PP conditions (B,E)
participants saw a virtual body in their near extrapersonal space when
looking to the left. The two levels of the factor “bodily appearance” are
shown in [A,C (D,F)] for a female (male) participant: in the HA conditions
participants had a co-located virtual body with a realistic human
appearance (A,D), while in the MA condition a co-located virtual body
resembling a plastic mannequin (C,F).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 83 | 4
Maselli and Slater Full body ownership illusion
the haptic vest and was negligible (<10ms). The asynchronous
condition was implemented by randomly activating the vibrators
when the virtual tapping was visualized, so that the touch and the
visual collisions were not correlated.
2.3. PARTICIPANTS
A total of 54 naïve subjects were recruited for the study, 9 for
each of the six conditions over the three experiments (Table 1).
Participants were recruited from the University campus or from a
database of persons who had previously agreed to being contacted
for participation in VR experiments. All subjects participated
in only one experiment—i.e., it was a between-groups design.
Experiment 1 tested 36 subjects (18 female, mean age 23.3, SD
5.1). Experiments 2 and 3 each involved 18 subjects (experi-
ment 2: 7 female, mean age 29.4, SD 7.6; experiment 3: 8 female,
mean age 25.4, SD 4.6). Note that the [VT, HT] group in exper-
iment 1 has the same experimental configuration as the 1PP
experimental group in experiment 2. For this reason we could
use the same experimental group independently for the two
experiments. The same applies for the [⊥VT, ¬HT] group in
experiment 1 and the HA group in experiment 3.
The study was performed according to institutional ethics and
national standards for the protection of human participants, and
it was approved by the Comité Ético de Investigación of the
University of Barcelona. All participants signed an informed con-
sent form and filled in a pre-questionnaire to collect demographic
information before taking part in the experiment. They were then
assigned arbitrarily to one of the six conditions andwere paide10
after the experiment was concluded. In the pre-questionnaire all
participants were asked “Have you ever experience ‘virtual reality’
before?”, with possible responses on a scale from 1 (no experi-
ence) to 7 (extensive experience). The response was on average
low (median value 1), with only 6 participants out of 54 scoring 4
or higher values.
2.4. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Participants were instructed to sit comfortably on a chair with
their legs resting on a footstool. They entered the virtual
FIGURE 2 | The vibrotactile device used in the experiments. The left
panel shows the haptic vest used to deliver touch sensations: vibrators
were located on the vest, mapping the location of the contact points of the
ball’s pre-recorded path with the avatar’s chest. The right panel shows the
paths followed by the virtual ball (blue lines) and its contact points with the
avatar chest (yellow dots). In synchronous conditions the vibrators array
was synchronized with the pre-recorded path, so that each vibrator was
activated when the ball reached the corresponding path-chest contact point.
environment using a wide field-of-view head-tracked, HMD. We
used a NVIS nVisor SX111 HMD with dual SXGA displays of
76◦H × 64◦V degrees field of view per eye, corresponding to
a global field-of-view of 111◦ horizontal and 60◦ vertical, with
a resolution of 1280 × 1024 per eye displayed at 60Hz. Head
tracking was performed by a 6-DOF Intersense IS-900 device.
Depending on the gender and the condition assigned, each partic-
ipant was exposed to one of the scenes displayed in stereo within
the HMD, shown in Figure 1. Participants in every condition were
instructed to not move their body from the neck down for the
whole duration of the experiment. Participants in HT conditions
were explicitly asked to turn their head and look around the envi-
ronment, while those in ¬HT conditions were asked not to move
the head and not to gaze around.
After an adaptation period of about 30 s, a yellow ball appeared
in the scene and moved toward the virtual body. When it struck
the body it activated the vibrators on the haptic vest (in syn-
chronous or asynchronous mode according to the condition).
Then it bounced off the body moving away again. This tapping
phase lasted for an interval of 2min. In this phase participants
were instructed to pay attention to the virtual body and to the
tapping ball. At the end of the tapping phase the ball disappeared
and the vibrators stopped. Participants were then asked to focus
their attention on the virtual body, and after about 30 s they were
exposed to a disturbing event: the lower legs slowly moved away
from the rest of the body for 10 s, covering a distance of about 1m
in the virtual room, and after that they returned to the original
position to recompose the whole body (see Figure 3). The choice
of this particular kind of disturbing event instead of amore classic
threat to the virtual body is based on two main motivations: first,
we wanted to avoid any kind of threat (even if virtual) directed
to the spatial location of the real body; second, we looked for an
event that explicitly breaks the integrity of the whole body.
2.5. RESPONSE VARIABLES
2.5.1. Questionnaire
For all the three experiments we used a 7-item questionnaire
designed to assess the level and quality of the illusion experienced
by the participants. Each question was scored by participants on
a given scale from 0 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The choice
FIGURE 3 | Snapshots of the legs separation event are shown for the
mannequin and human appearance modes in the case of a female
participants. The legs separation event lasted 10 s during which the legs
moved away from the body reaching a maximum distance of 1m. The legs
returned to their original position immediately after the 10 s, recomposing a
whole body.
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of an even number of points on the Likert scale was meant
to force scoring either on the agreement or on the disagree-
ment side. Having four points on each side further allowed for
various degrees of agreement/disagreement, so as to detect differ-
ences in the intensity of the experienced sensations (Cohen et al.,
2011).
The questionnaire is shown in Table 2. The items were formu-
lated by adapting questions from previous experiments on full
body illusions (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson,
2008; Slater et al., 2010). The main critical item is the one
tagged as mybody, which relates directly to the feeling of own-
ing the virtual body. The clothing item was also meant to test
the feeling of ownership following Slater et al. (2010) where
it was found that the body ownership illusion was highly cor-
related with the illusion of wearing the same clothes as the
virtual character. The items stress and discomfort were formu-
lated to detect the subjective response to the disturbing event.
These two apparently similar statements were meant to distin-
guish the feeling of weirdness (something weird is happening to
my body, but it is not stressful) from the feeling of stress that
is a state of anxiety. The catch item tested the desire of partic-
ipants to move and act in the virtual environment. The touch
item was meant to test the appropriate implementation of the
visuotactile stimulation: the proper functioning the vibrotactile
vest and its integration in the virtual environment had to be
demonstrated by having low/high scores to the touch item in
the asynchronous/synchronous modalities. Finally, the twobodies
item was a control question.
2.5.2. Heart rate deceleration
We monitored the physiological behavior of the participants by
recording their electrocardiogram (ECG) throughout the whole
duration of the experiment. This was used to obtain a measure
for the heart rate deceleration (HRD) in various stages of the
experiment. HRD has been previously shown to be a response
variable that significantly correlates with states of stress and
anxiety induced by sudden unpleasant stimuli (Bradley et al.,
2001; Cacioppo et al., 2007), and has been successfully used in
previous studies as a physiological correlate of the full body own-
ership illusion (Slater et al., 2010) and other perceptual illusions
(e.g., Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012). In our study, instead of
using a sudden threat, we have adopted a threat to the integrity
of the body that is extended in time, i.e., the legs separat-
ing from the rest of the virtual body, in slow motion, over a
period of 10 s. For this reason it is not possible to identify the
precise moment at which participants noticed this event. To
account for this, we introduced a new procedural definition for
the HRD.
The ECG signal was sampled at 256Hz using the g.tec portable
bio-signal acquisition device g.MOBIlab+1. ECG signals were
processed to extract the heart rate (HR) by first applying the auto-
matic search for QSR complex implemented in the gtec biosignal
analysis software g.BSanalyze 2, and then by visually inspecting
the search results to correct for possible missing or false iden-
tifications. The HRD response to the legs separation, HRDlegs,
was calculated within the period of 6 s immediately after the legs
started to move away from the rest of the virtual body, by looking
for the first sustained deceleration event occurring in this time
window (i.e., the earliest time interval in which the HR signal
was monotonically decreasing). In order to have a reliable detec-
tion of sustained deceleration associated to the unpleasant event,
we imposed two constraints: (1) the extent of the time inter-
val of monotonic deceleration had to be larger than 1.5 s, so as
to ensure that this was a sustained deceleration; (2) the starting
point of the sustained deceleration should be at most 2 s away
from the starting edge of the 6 s period. The latter constraint
was meant to account for the possibility that the participants did
not immediately detect the onset of the unpleasant event. Once
we identified the deceleration event in the HR signal, we calcu-
lated the HRD as: HR/t, with HR = HR(tmax) − HR(tmin)
and t = tmin − tmax. Here tmin and tmax denote the location
in time of the minimum and maximum, respectively. For those
cases in which the HR signal was monotonically increasing within
the whole 6 s window, we have used an analogous procedure
to obtain negative HRD values, describing in fact a heart rate
acceleration.
As the HRD measurements are expected to be subject-
dependent, we have further estimated a measure for the HRD
baseline of each participant. In order to obtain a representative
baseline value, we have applied the same procedure described
above for measuring HRD from single sustained deceleration
event, in 10 different time windows (each of 6 s) within the 20 s
rest period preceding the legs separation. The baseline value,
HRDbase was defined as the mean of these 10HRD measures.
1http://www.gtec.at/Products/Hardware-and-Accessories/g.
MOBIlab-Specs-Features
2http://www.gtec.at/Products/Software/g.BSanalyze-Specs-Features
Table 2 | Questionnaire.
Variable name Item Statement category
Mybody I felt that the body I saw was my body Ownership
Clothing I felt that I was wearing different clothing to my real clothing Ownership
Stress I was stressed when I saw the legs coming apart Psychophysical reaction
Discomfort I felt physical discomfort when the legs were coming apart Psychophysical reaction
Catch I wanted to try to catch the yellow ball Interaction in VR
Touch It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the yellow ball touching my body Implementation
Twobodies I felt that I had two bodies Control
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3. RESULTS
3.1. STATISTICAL METHODS
Since the responses to the questionnaires are ordinal and not
interval scaled, we used non-parametric tests for the question-
naire analysis. Data from experiment 1 were analyzed with the
Friedman test for non-parametric analysis of 2 × 2 designs for
testing the effect of each factor, while taking into account the
other as a blocking factor. Note that the Friedman test does not
allow detection of interaction effects. When comparing two sam-
ples, as in experiments 2 and 3 and in some post analysis of
experiment 1, we used the Mann–Whitney U test.
The HRD data were inspected in order to look for changes
induced by the legs separation event, one that obviously affected
the integrity of the body, with respect to the baseline. We per-
formed analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing the change
in HRD induced by the threat and measured as HRD =
HRDlegs − HRDbase, between the experimental conditions of
each experiment. Finally, we bring various results together in one
simple path analysis model that helps understand the results of
the experiments.
All analysis was carried out using the Stata 12 statistical
package3.
3.2. EXPERIMENT 1: MULTIMODAL CONTINGENCIES
3.2.1. Questionnaire
Experiment 1 was a 2 × 2 design with factors visuotactile (VT vs.
⊥VT) and head tracking (HT vs. ¬HT). Figure 4 shows the box-
plots comparing the distributions of scores in the four conditions
for relevant items. It is evident that there is no significant differ-
ence between the four conditions with respect to the sensation of
body ownership (item mybody). The Friedman test applied to the
3http://www.stata.com/stata12/
mybody item confirmed that there is no significant difference with
respect to both the visuotactile and head tracking factors. Median
scores were at least 4 in all the four groups, suggesting that par-
ticipants experienced some illusion of body ownership over the
virtual body whatever the visuotactile and head tracking modes.
Responses to the clothing item also received high scores in all the
four conditions (all medians at least 4).
The stress and discomfort items had median values below 4
and no significant difference was found between the four condi-
tions. Nevertheless, verbal reports revealed that most participants
experienced a strange sensation while seeing the virtual legs sep-
arating, a fact often corroborated by spontaneous exclamations
and verbalizations during and after the legs separation.
Scores to the touch item were significantly higher for the VT
conditions than for the ⊥VT, for both the HT (p = 0.009, Mann–
Whitney; average ranks: 6.28 for ⊥VT, 12.72 for VT) and ¬HT
(p = 0.001, Mann–Whitney; average ranks: 49 for ⊥VT, 122 for
VT) groups, showing that our implementation of the visuotactile
stimulation via automatic mechanical vibrators was effective. On
the other hand participants had significantly greater scores in the
HT compared to the ¬HT mode, in the ⊥VT mode (p = 0.048,
Mann–Whitney; average ranks: 7.06 for ¬HT, 11.94 for HT),
while no significant difference between the HT levels is present in
the VT mode group. The Friedman test applied to the touch item
detected significant differences with respect to both the VT fac-
tor (p < 0.0005) and HT factor (p = 0.042). It is noticeable that
the asynchronous visuotactile stimulation was clearly perceived
as wrong (median score is 1) only in the [⊥VT, ¬HT] condition,
while in the [⊥VT, HT] condition the same asynchronous stimu-
lation till had a median score of 4. Hence some participants still
perceived this as a touch sensation congruent with the collision
of the virtual ball with the body—as indicated from their reports
and scores that reached as high as 6.
***
*
**
FIGURE 4 | Questionnaire data from experiment 1, in which we
investigate the role of viusotactile and visual sensorimotor
contingencies. No difference was found in the mybody item
showing that the illusion was not affected by either of the two
multisensory modalities (when a 1PP is provided over a realistic
virtual body). Significant differences were found for the touch item
with respect to the visuotactile mode, for both levels of the head
tracking factor. This showed that the vibrotactile device used to
deliver touch sensations was effective. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗∗p < 0.001 from Mann–Whitney test.
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Scores to the catch item were significantly greater in the HT
condition than in the ¬HT for the ⊥VT group (p = 0.014,
Mann–Whitney; average ranks: 6.5 for ¬HT, 12.5 for HT). No
significant difference was found for the VT group. Analogously,
a significant difference with respect to the visuotactile factor was
found for the ¬HT group (p = 0.015, Mann–Whitney; average
ranks: 6.5 for ⊥VT, 12.5 for VT) but not for the HT one. The
Friedman test detected significant differences between the scores
to the catch item with respect to the head tracking factor (0.005),
but not for the visuotactile one. It is interesting to note that the
median score was much smaller only in the [⊥VT, ¬HT] condi-
tion. For the other three groups, when congruent multisensory
and/or visual sensorimotor correlations were provided (VT or
HT or both), the scores tended to be quite high with medians at
least 4. This showed that the desire to move and act in the virtual
environment was mainly driven by multisensory/sensorimotor
correlations and did not depend on the sense of ownership over
the virtual body alone.
Since the level of ownership turned out to be independent of
two experimental factors, we can further examine whether there
are some undetected differences in the scoring to the mybody item
by combining samples.We first compared the two visuotactile lev-
els irrespectively of the head tracking mode and vice versa (18
subjects per group). In both cases the Mann–Whitney test found
no significant difference. The same procedure was applied to the
other questionnaire items for which no dependence on either
VT and HT was found (all but touch and catch). This confirmed
previous findings, i.e., that the feeling of ownership over the vir-
tual body did not depend on either the visuotactile and the head
tracking modes signals.
3.2.2. Heart rate deceleration
Two-Way ANOVA of HRD showed that neither of the two
factors, nor their interaction, was significant in modulating the
HRD response when threatening the integrity of the body [VT:
F(1, 32) = 0.40, p = 0.53; HT: F(1, 32) = 1.32, p = 0.26; interac-
tion: F(1, 32) = 1.80, p = 0.19]. We have further checked specif-
ically for the effect of the visuotactile factor, collapsing together
the two headtracking levels. The same was done for testing further
the effect of the headtracking factor, grouping together the visuo-
tactile levels. In both cases no significant differences were found
[VT: F(1, 34) = 0.39, p = 0.54; HT: F(1, 34) = 1.31, p = 0.26].
3.3. EXPERIMENT 2: PERSPECTIVE
3.3.1. Questionnaire
Figure 5 shows the boxplot comparing scores to themybody items
from 1PP and the 3PP groups. From the figure one can see a
noticeable effect of visual perspective. Comparing the two groups,
[1PP, VT, HT] vs. [3PP, VT, HT] with 9 participants each, a
Mann–Whitney test returned a significant difference (p = 0.004;
average ranks: 5.89 for 3PP, 13.11 for 1PP). For all the other items
no significant differences were found.
Given the results from experiment 1, i.e., visuotactile and head
tracking modes have no effect on the ownership illusion, we
combined the groups across these levels in order to increase the
power of the test. The Mann–Whitney test comparing the 3PP
group (9 subjects) with that of 1PP with both visuotactile and
***
**
FIGURE 5 | Questionnaire data from experiment 2, in which we
compare groups with different perspective levels. 3PP (9 subjects),
1PP9 (9 subjects) and 1PP36 (36 subjects, where all 1PP conditions were
grouped together irrespectively of the visuotactile and head tracking
modes). The significant difference in the mybody item showed that 1PP is
an essential condition for the full body ownership illusion. ∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗∗p < 0.001 from Mann–Whitney test.
head tracking levels merged (36 subjects), resulted in significant
differences in the perspective levels for both the itemmybody, now
with greater significance (p = 0.0007; average ranks: 10 for 3PP,
26.25 for 1PP), and clothing (p = 0.024; average ranks: 14.28 for
3PP, 25.18 for 1PP).
3.3.2. Heart rate deceleration
One-Way ANOVA of HRD resulted in no significant effect of
the perspective factor on the HRD response when threatening
the integrity of the body [F(1, 16) = 1.21, p = 0.26]. No difference
was found when further comparing the 3PP group with the 1PP36
group [F(1, 16) = 0.10, p = 0.75] .
3.4. EXPERIMENT 3: BODILY APPEARANCE
3.4.1. Questionnaire
Figure 6 shows the boxplots comparing the scores to the item
mybody for the HA and MA groups. No significant differences
were found between the two groups in the [1PP, ⊥VT, ¬HT]
configuration (9 subjects per group; HA9 vs. MA). However,
since there was no dependence of the ownership illusion on the
visuotactile and head tracking factors (results from experiment
1), we could group the levels of these two factors. Doing so we
obtained a larger sample of 36 subjects for the HA (HA36) con-
dition to be compared with the MA group (9 subjects). In this
case we found significant difference for both the items mybody
(p = 0.003; average ranks: 11.44 for HA, 25.89 for HA) and cloth-
ing (p = 0.011; average ranks: 13.17 for HA, 25.46 for HA). This
suggests that a realistic body appearance significantly enhances
the ownership illusion. It is important here to note that despite
the differences found in the two visual appearance groups and
despite the asynchronous visuotactile stimulation, the sense of
ownership was present to some extent even when the virtual
body had a mannequin appearance, as shown from the fact that
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participants in the MA group had a median score of 3 on the
mybody item.
3.4.2. Heart rate deceleration
One-Way ANOVA showed no significant difference in HRD
between the two body appearance groups [F(1, 16) = 1.24,
p = 28]. No difference was found when further comparing the
MA group with the HA36 group [F(1, 16) = 0.60, p = 0.44].
3.5. PATH ANALYSIS
It is not too surprising that we found no apparent effect on the
HRD of the legs separation threat to the body, since there was no
differential effect on body ownership of most of the factor levels.
We would expect that only in conditions of a high body owner-
ship illusion would the threat to the integrity of the body cause
the type of abhorrent response that might be reflected in HRDlegs.
We found a strong impact on ownership only for the manipula-
tion that involved perspective (experiment 2). Hence in this case
we would expect an impact on HRDlegs. However, the situation
is not straightforward since the HRD during the event would be
likely to be associated with the baseline HRD but also and sep-
arately be associated with the level of ownership, which itself is
impacted by the manipulation in perspective (1PP or 3PP). For
this reason we used path analysis to further explore the possibil-
ity that HRDlegs is indirectly affected by perspective through the
feeling of ownership, a possibility that is not testable using sim-
ple analysis of variance. We propose the path model in Figure 7,
in which perspective directly affects ownership, ownership affects
HRDlegs, and HRDlegs further depends on HRDbase. The latter
path takes into account intrinsic HRD differences between indi-
viduals. We used the scores from the questionnaire item mybody
as a quantitative estimate of ownership. Note that here we treat
FIGURE 6 | Questionnaire data from experiment 3, in which we
compared two groups that had different virtual bodies. Mannequin
appearance: MA (9 subjects); human appearance: HA9 (9 subjects) and
HA36 (36 subjects, where all the human appearance conditions in the 1PP
were grouped together irrespectively of the visuotactile and head tracking
mode). Significant differences were found when comparing the MA group
with the HA36 group. This showed that a realistic body appearance
significantly enhances the illusion experience. ∗∗p < 0.01 from
Mann–Whitney test.
mybody as an interval scaled variable; even if this is not formally
justified, it is an approximation usually adopted as it provides
useful exploratory tool.
We used the structural equation modeling software of Stata 12
to estimate the coefficients and the corresponding significant lev-
els, using the asymptotic distribution free option, since we had no
reason to suppose that the variables involved follow amultivariate
normal distribution.
The model proposed provides a very good fit to the data. A test
of the goodness of fit of the model against the saturated model
showed a good fit, with χ2(2) = 2.04, p > 0.36. All estimates
are summarized in Table 3. This result shows how the feeling
of ownership is strongly affected by perspective as already dis-
cussed. Additionally it shows that, even though there is there
is not a direct significant impact of perspective on HRD, the
response to the threat in terms of HRD increases with own-
ership. Also, as expected, the HRD response to the threat is
highly correlated with HRDbase, reflecting the intersubject HRD
variability.
The factor perspective then has an effect on HRD mediated
through the subjective level of ownership as measured by the
questionnaire variable mybody.
4. DISCUSSION
Our study contributes several key findings regarding the full body
ownership illusion. Three experiments were specifically designed
perspective ownership HRDlegs
ε1
HRDbase
ε2
2.9 .21
1.5 .75
2.9
.5
.25 2.8 -1
2.4
1.8
FIGURE 7 | Path analysis model that fits data from experiment 2. The
boxes represent the variables: perspective can be 0 or 1 for 3PP and 1PP,
respectively; ownership is the response to the questionnaire item mybody;
HRDbase is the heart rate deceleration baseline, and HRDlegs is the heart
rate deceleration measured right after the legs start separating. The circles
represent random error terms.
Table 3 | Coefficients, standard errors, and p-values estimates from
path analysis applied to the model in Figure 6, using data from
experiment 2.
Variable Coefficients Standard errors P
OWNERSHIP
Perspective 2.89 0.60 <0.001
Intercept 2.79 0.51 <0.001
HRDlegs
Ownership 0.21 0.70 0.003
HRDbase 0.82 0.60 <0.001
Intercept −1.03 0.27 <0.001
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to pinpoint the main perceptual cues that contribute to the full
body ownership illusion, to determine their specific role and
assess their interaction. Motivated by previous results in the
literature, we focused on the following main perceptual cues:
visuotactile and visual (head-based) sensorimotor stimulation,
visual perspective, and body appearance. The main findings are
compatible with the following statements:
• First person perspective is a necessary condition for the full
body ownership illusion.
• The full body ownership illusion can result from the sole
effect of seeing a realistic virtual body in the same location
and posture as the physical body, a configuration that con-
tributes toward the experience of correct visuoproprioceptive
cues, with no need for the additional contribution of congruent
multisensory and/or head-based sensorimotor cues.
• The appearance of the virtual body and more specifically its
level of realism in terms of skin texture and clothes, can
influence the strength of the full body ownership illusion.
• Multisensory and/or sensorimotor contingencies can influence
the level of the full body ownership illusion, having a rein-
forcing effect when congruent and a damping effect when
incongruent.
• The full body ownership illusion can modulate the way touch
is perceived, in that asynchronous visuotactile cues can be
consciously perceived as correct, especially when there is first
person perspective and a realistic virtual body.
Note that we did not directly explore the effect of visuomotor cor-
relations, as participants could only move the head and were not
allow to move the rest of the body. We speculate that congru-
ent visuomotor correlations provide powerful multimodal cues
that have a similar—though stronger—effect on the ownership
illusion as the multisensory and head-based visual sensorymo-
tor contingencies explored in our experiments. This speculation
needs to be further tested in a future study.
In the following we discuss the above findings in the context of
the relevant literature, highlighting the new findings with respect
to previous studies.
4.1. THE ROLE OF PERSPECTIVE
In experiment 2 we found clear evidence for 1PP being a critical
factor for eliciting the full body ownership illusion. The ques-
tionnaire results showed a strong significant difference between
participants with 1PP and 3PP, in that only the first group expe-
rienced the illusion of ownership with respect to the virtual
body. HRD data further support this finding (see section 3.5).
Moreover, our experimental set-up showed that 3PP inhibited the
illusion even when various form of congruent multisensory and
sensorimotor cues were provided. Therefore, as a general result,
it could be said that first person perspective over the fake body
is a necessary condition for the onset of the full body ownership
illusion. Our results bring also further insights on the issue raised
in Petkova et al. (2011) as to whether 3PP prevents the illusion
because it violates the 1PP as such, or less restrictively, because
(as in their experiment) the body to be owned is seen in the far
extrapersonal space. In our experimental set-up, the virtual body
is seen from 3PP and it is located within the peripersonal space.
The finding that the illusion is suppressed in this set-up demon-
strates that violation of 1PP over the fake body is sufficient to
prevent the full body ownership illusion, even if the body is seen
in the peripersonal space.
Our results are consistent with previous findings from stud-
ies on both the RHI and the full body ownership illusion. In the
RHI paradigm, experiments by different groups have investigated
the effect of displacing the position of the artificial hand with
respect to the real physical one in order to determine the role
of spatial congruency between visual and proprioceptive infor-
mation. For the sake of the present discussion, the majority of
these manipulations could be interestingly reinterpreted in terms
of perspective over the body-part to be integrated, having 3PP for
those cases in which the fake limb position violates constraints
from 1PP, i.e., when the limb is outside the peripersonal space
(Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Lloyd, 2007) or in anatomi-
cally impossible configurations, e.g., at 180◦ (Ehrsson, 2004) and
when handendness does not match (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005).
By doing this, the result is that all those cases in which the fake
hand position violates constraints from 1PP have been found to
work against the illusion, supporting the general conclusion that
first person perspective is indeed a critical factor for eliciting the
illusion of ownership over an external object. Analogously, stud-
ies focused on the full body ownership illusion showed that the
illusion could not be induced in various configurations of 3PP,
e.g., seeing the body laying in extrapersonal space (Petkova et al.,
2011) or seeing the body located to the side in peripersonal space
(as in our experiment 2). In both configurations, participants
did not experience the illusion despite synchronous visuotac-
tile stimulation and/or visual sensorimotor contingencies being
provided.
A second group of studies reported, however, different con-
clusions on the role of visual perspective in ownership illusions.
Preston and Newport (2012) presented an experimental setting
in which participants experienced an illusion over their own arm
filmed from a distance of 2m and displayed on a screen (the arm
image in the video was also manipulated so to show it elongated).
Similarly, a number of studies concern experimentally induced
OBEs, in which participants experience self-identification with
a virtual full-body seen from a 3PP (Lenggenhager et al., 2007,
2009; Aspell et al., 2009; Ionta et al., 2011). The resulting sense
of ownership and touch experienced over a body located in far
extrapersonal space is in contradiction with the results reviewed
above.
How can these two classes of results be compatible with
each other? A possible explanation that has been recently pro-
posed (Petkova et al., 2011; Ehrsson, 2012) is that the self-
identification experienced during OBEs is in fact a form of visual
self-recognition rather than a somatic ownership illusion, similar
to the experience of recognizing oneself in a mirror. An element
in favor of this interpretation can be found in the seminal exper-
iment from Lenggenhager et al. (2007), where the same stroking
protocol was applied while visualizing either the filmed partic-
ipant’s body or that of a plastic mannequin. Although in both
cases a significant difference was found among the synchronous
and asynchronous stroking modes, the actual scores of the
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questionnaire item related to self-identification were lower in the
mannequin condition (Lenggenhager et al., 2007—supporting
online material). This seems to suggest that the self-identification
actually occurred only for participant seeing their own filmed
body, supporting the “self-recognition” hypothesis. On the other
hand, there are several objective measurements that provide evi-
dence for the back-stroking induced OBE to be an authentic
somatic illusion. Participants experiencing this illusion seem to
undergo a remapping of the visuotactile receptive field (RF)
(Aspell et al., 2009) and of the self-location in an allocentric spa-
tial reference frame (Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009). A selective
activation of the TPJ analogous to that occurring in neurologi-
cal OBEs (Ionta et al., 2011), and of bilateral PMC and medial
sensorimotor cortex (Lenggenhager et al., 2011) have also been
found.We suggest here that the full body ownership and the back-
stroking OBE are in fact two different kinds of body illusions,
which involve the activation of different neural patterns (see sec-
tion 4.4). A rigorous comparison of the two illusions requires,
however, a dedicated experimental set-up and is beyond the scope
of this paper.
A recent study of patients with the somatoparaphrenic delu-
sion of disowning their own left arm (Fotopoulou et al., 2011)
provided further insights on the role of visual perspective. It
showed that the disownership of the arm in these patients can
be suddenly extinguished when the arm is seen from 3PP (in
a mirror). Disownership was reinstated, however, a few seconds
after switching again to a 1PP over the arm. These results seem
to suggest that the sense of ownership requires the activation
of a perceptual mechanism specific to 1PP that is impaired in
somatoparaphrenic patients. When the perspective is switched
to 3PP with the use of mirrors, the visual processing of the
own body undergoes a spatial transformation, and it may no
longer require the impaired mechanisms responsible for the
perceived ownership/disownership. Given the prompt switching
between the sense of ownership and disownership, when chang-
ing from 1PP to 3PP and vice versa, this mechanism is likely to be
purely perceptual and bottom–up. We propose that a plausible
candidate for this is provided by consistent visuopropriocep-
tice cues and by the resulting pattern of neural activation. We
discuss this possibility in the following section as well as in
section 4.4.
4.2. THE ROLE OF MULTIMODAL CONTINGENCIES
Results from experiment 1 showed that subjects in an immer-
sive virtual environment may experience a sense of ownership
over a highly realistic virtual body seen from a first person per-
spective, independently of the visuotactile and head-based visual
sensorimotor cues received. This is supported from both ques-
tionnaire and HRD responses to the event disrupting the integrity
of the whole virtual body; no significant differences between
the four groups were found in either measurement. This sug-
gests that, when the body is not moving, the effect of congruent
visuoproprioceptive cues alone, as provided by having a high
degree of spatial overlap between the physical body and the real-
istic virtual body, is a sufficient condition for inducing a full
body ownership illusion. Since the ownership illusion occurs
when there is congruent visuoproprioceptive feedback, for a static
body, then it should be all the more powerful when there is
additionally congruent visuomotor feedback—so that the vir-
tual body moves synchronously with, and spatially matches, real
body movements. Note that the requirement for a high degree
of overlap between the physical and virtual bodies is a stronger
constraint than 1PP by itself, so that it is possible to have 1PP
and no congruent visuoproprioceptive cues at the same time. For
example, one could have 1PP over a virtual body with a plausi-
ble body posture that is nevertheless different from the posture
of the obscured physical body, or 1PP over a human-like body
that have different size and/or body proportions with respect to
the real body. While 1PP seems to be a necessary condition for
experiencing an ownership illusion, other work seems to sug-
gest that the exact position and posture of the real and virtual
bodies (body parts) do not need to coincide in space (e.g., de la
Peña et al., 2010; Petkova et al., 2011). Somatic illusions can be
experienced in such configurations if additional congruent mul-
tisensory and/or sensorimotor cues are provided, and in these
cases proprioception can be altered and shifted toward the vir-
tual body, as shown by measurements of the proprioceptive drift
in the RHI (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) and OBEs (e.g.,
Lenggenhager et al., 2007), as well as reports of changes in the
perceived body posture (de la Peña et al., 2010). With our exper-
iment we have shown that when there is a high degree of overlap
between the real and virtual body, the illusion can be experi-
enced with no need for additional congruentmultisensory and/or
sensorimotor cues.
Our results further show that the illusion arising from having
a high degree of spatial overlap between the virtual and physi-
cal bodies can be sustained, even when asynchronous visuotactile
stimulation is delivered to the participants and in the absence
of any other form of congruent multimodal stimulation. As a
further interesting outcome, we found that having or not visual
sensoriomotor contingencies from head tracking affected the way
participants perceived touch; in the group that received visual
sensorimotor contingencies from head tracking throughout the
experiment, the asynchronous visuotactile stimulation was not
perceived as completely wrong, while when headmovements were
not allowed and the field of view was static the same visuotactile
stimulation was clearly reported to be wrong. This is an impor-
tant finding that clearly indicates that there is an interaction effect
in the way these multimodal stimulations are processed, and that
the way touch is consciously perceived can be modulated by the
processing of other perceptual cues, possibly via the onset of the
illusion.
Altogether, our results present various novel insights with
respect to previous studies. In fact, it has been extensively
reported that the processing of congruent visuotactile and/or
sensorimotor stimulation is a necessary condition for the exper-
imental elicitation of bodily illusion in healthy subjects. This is
the case for most of the reported experiences of extracorporeal
object assimilation (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Schaefer et al.,
2009; Guterstam et al., 2011) and of body deformation illusions
(Lackner, 1988; Ehrsson, 2005; Schaefer et al., 2007; Newport and
Preston, 2010; Normand et al., 2011; Kilteni et al., 2012; Preston
and Newport, 2012), as well as of full body ownership and out-
of-body illusions (Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009; Petkova and
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Ehrsson, 2008; Aspell et al., 2009; Ionta et al., 2011). In some
cases, it has been noticed that incongruent multisensory infor-
mation can be assimilated without destroying the illusion. For
example, Slater et al. (2010) found that asynchronous visuotac-
tile stimulation did not prevent a full body ownership illusion in
an IVR setting where participants had 1PP over the virtual body
and received visual sensorimotor congruent stimulation from
head-tracking.
The first question that arises when comparing our results with
those from previous studies concerns the reason why previous
studies have repeatedly found that synchronous visuotactile (or
head-based sensorimotor) stimulation was a necessary condition
for eliciting a body ownership illusion, while we have found that
this is not the case. There are two main points that may answer
this question. First, the hypothesis that “the sole effect of con-
gruent visuoproprioceptive cues, provided by a high degree of
spatial overlap between the physical and virtual bodies, is a suf-
ficient condition for inducing a full body ownership” has never
been tested explicitly. The RHI paradigm intrinsically involved
the use of visuotactile stimulation, with the control condition
being the asynchronous mode rather than a “no touch” con-
dition. This paradigm has been extended automatically to the
case of full body illusions. In spite of this, it has been shown
that the RHI can persist during period in which visuotactile
stimulation was not delivered (Hohwy and Paton, 2010). The
experimental design included nevertheless an initial phase of
synchronous visuotactile stimulation that may have induced the
illusion, which then persisted. Importantly, this experiment used
stereo goggles that allowed a high degree of spatial matching
between the real and virtual hands. In the same study, it was
shown that after a period of synchronous visuotactile stimu-
lation participants kept perceiving touch sensations when real
touch was no longer delivered on the real hand, but appeared
to be applied on the virtual hand. These findings are in per-
fect agreement with our results. Second, the reason for which
other studies did not come to a similar conclusion can also
be due to the fact that in most RHI experiments, apart from
those using immersive stereo displays, the spatial locations of
the real and artificial hand cannot perfectly coincide and con-
sequently the visuoproprioceptive information provided is not
fully congruent. It is interesting to note that all those experiments
in which the ownership illusion was not disrupted by incon-
gruent visuotactile stimuation (Hohwy and Paton, 2010; Slater
et al., 2010; our experiment 1), used stereo vision, thus achiev-
ing a high degree of spatial overlap between the real and the
virtual body (or body part) and, additionally, found that the asyn-
chronous visuotactile information was not consciously perceived
as wrong.
In order to have a unitary scenario that would allow the
unification of the findings of different studies, we further need
to address the following question: why other studies in which
the physical and virtual bodies were highly spatially coincident
(Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova et al., 2011) found syn-
chronous visuotactile stimulation to be necessary for the full body
ownership illusion? To answer this question we move to the next
section, where we discuss the role of the visual appearance of the
virtual body.
4.3. THE ROLE OF BODY APPEARANCE
We have explicitly explored the role played by bodily appearance
in experiment 3. Previous studies have already shown that non-
humanoid shaped objects fail to be integrated and assimilated
as pertaining to one’s own body. The RHI does not work when
a wooden no-hand-shaped object is stroked synchronously with
the real hand (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). Tsakiris et al (2010)
further extended this finding, pointing out the need for an object
to preserve precise, informative corporeal structural features in
order to be integrable as one’s own body part. Analogously,
full body ownership illusions, as well as experimentally induced
OBEs do not work when substituting the virtual body with a
wooden block having the same dimensions of the fake body
(Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). Our
experiment went beyond this by testing whether the level of real-
ism of a humanoid body could modulate the intensity of the
ownership illusion, and whether it interacts with other factors,
such as the provided visuotactile stimulation.
The results from our experiment showed that participants
experienced on average significantly higher levels of illusion when
seeing a virtual body with common human features in term of
skin texture and clothes, compared to the condition in which
they were seeing a plastic mannequin. Nevertheless, the view
of human-shaped mannequin does not completely dampen the
illusion, consistent with previous reports (Petkova and Ehrsson,
2008; Petkova et al., 2011). When compared with findings from
previous studies, our results further suggest that there may be an
interaction of the body appearance with the visuotactile compo-
nent. When seeing a mannequin body, synchronous visuotactile
stimulation is found to be necessary to induce a vivid full body
ownership illusion (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova et al.,
2011). At the same time we found that, when the realism of the
body is enhanced, a vivid illusion can occur without the need
for additional synchronous visuotactile stimuation. Moreover, the
illusion was preserved also when incongruent visuotacticle infor-
mation was processed. This result supports the possibility of a
top–down cognitive mechanism that modulates the way in which
multisensory information is processed from the bottom–up per-
ceptual stream. Our findings are in fact analogous to what has
been established for the RHI: first the hand-object needs to pass a
fitness test in terms of anatomical, volumetric and postural con-
straints (see Tsakiris et al, 2010 and reference therein). Once the
fitness test is passed, other features enhancing the realism of the
object to incorporate, e.g., the skin texture, can modulate the
intensity of the illusion (Haans et al., 2008).
4.4. A BASIC MODEL FOR THE FULL BODY OWNERSHIP ILLUSION
In this section we sketch a speculative basic model for the neural
underpinning of the full body ownership illusion on the basis of
key findings from neurophysiological studies in the monkey.
We first review the main relevant neurophysiological results
that provide a rational for the proposed model. Graziano et al.
(2000) reported finding visuoproprioceptive bimodal neurons
in the area 5 of the primate parietal cortex, whose properties
are extremely relevant for the present discussion. These bimodal
neurons respond to both the seen and the perceived (by propri-
oception) positions of a limb, even when the seen limb is fake.
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The first important property of such neurons is that they are sen-
sitive to the visual content of the stimuli, so that their response
is modulated by the position of an object in their visual RF only
if the object contains the proper anatomical features of the limb
that the same neurons encode by proprioception. Interestingly,
the fake arm used in that study is extremely realistic, having been
prepared by a taxidermist from a monkey of the same species.
Visual and proprioceptive signals can be additive or may be com-
bined in more complex fashion, according to the specific neuron.
However, the overall averaged activity of this bimodal neuronal
population shows a modulation associated with the relative posi-
tions of the fake and real arms, the activity being the highest when
the locations of the two limbs are the closest. The third important
property of such neurons is that their response is modulated by
the relative position of the fake and real arms only when the fake
arm location has a plausible position with respect to the rest of
the body, meaning that no modulation was observed when the
realistic fake arm was in a non-matching handedness position or
in a backward orientation (with the hand being near the shoul-
der and the cut end extended outward). A further fundamental
finding of the same study is the identification of a second pop-
ulation of trimodal neurons (responding to visual, tactile, and
proprioceptive signals) in the same area 5. Neurons in this pop-
ulation encode the position of the real arm by proprioception,
but not that of a just-seen fake arm; they become sensitive to
the view of the fake arm only when the latter is stroked syn-
chronously (but not asynchronously) with the real arm. Area
5 have been also found to host neurons with large RF, which
can be bilateral and can involve multiple body parts (Iwamura
et al, 1994; Iwamura, 1998), making them plausible candidates
for encoding information about the whole body. Other higher-
ordered somatosensory areas have been shown to host bimodal
andmultimodal neuronal populations with large and bilateral RF.
These include the ventral intraparietal (VIP) area and a polysen-
sory zone in the precentral gyrus, hosting bimodal visuotactile
neurons, as well as trimodal neurons that additionally responds
to auditory or vestibular stimuli (Duhamel et al., 1998; Bremmer
et al., 2002; Graziano et al., 2006). A more comprehensive review
of the neurophysiological studies of body representation in the
monkey brain, which are relevant for the study of human body
perception is beyond the scope of this paper and can be found in
Blanke (2012).
In the following we propose a speculative basic model for the
full body ownership illusion, influenced by the numerous analo-
gies between the findings from neurophysiological recording in
the monkey discussed above and the results from the work done
on experimentally induced bodily illusions, including the main
results of the present study. The same model would apply for
the RHI. We propose that distinct bimodal and multimodal neu-
ronal populations are responsible for the ownership illusion. A
driving population of bimodal visuoproprioceptive neurons, with
properties analogous to those of area 5 neurons in the monkey,
would yield the minimal contribution necessary for the illusion
to occur. Other bimodal and multimodal populations would have
instead a secondary modulating effect. The visuoproprioceptive
population activates when the seen body looks similar to and is
located close to the real hidden body (i.e., when highly congruent
static visuoproprioceptive correlations are provided). As for area
5 neurons in the monkey, this population activates only when
the virtual body satisfies the main basic anatomical constraints
in terms of shape and visual perspective. The higher the spa-
tial coincidence between the virtual and the real body, the more
intense would be the driven activity in this population and the
resulting sense of ownership. Visuotactile, visual sensorimotor
and other multimodal stimulations would trigger other bimodal
and/or multimodal populations that have the effect of enhancing
or dampening the sense of ownership, depending onwhether they
are delivered with proper correlations or not.
In this scenario we can isolate various steps for the “building-
up” of an ownership illusion, encompassing most of the results
that have been found in experimental studies on bodily illu-
sions. If anatomical constraints are not satisfied in terms of
body shape and visual perspective, no illusion occurs, because
the driving visuoproprioceptive population is shut down, no
matter whether other proper multimodal contingencies are pro-
vided. When anatomically constraints are satisfied, a high degree
of spatial overlap between the virtual body and the real body
could enhance the strength of the illusion. The additional con-
tribution of the top–down effect from a high visual realism of
the fake body could bring the illusion to saturation. In this
condition, the reinforcing modulation of congruent multimodal
correlations cannot be appreciated easily, because the illusion is
already strong; moreover, the illusion can be sustained despite
the dampening effect of incongruent multimodal stimulation (as
in experiment 1), although severe and sustained incongruency
could break the illusion completely. If anatomically constraints
are met but the realism and colocation are not at a high degree,
the driving visuoproprioceptive population will be activated, but
with a moderate/low intensity that does not necessarily corre-
spond to a perceptual illusion. In this condition, the modulating
effects of additional multimodal stimulations can be critical for
eliciting a vivid ownership illusion, when congruent, and more
effective in breaking the illusion (if present), when incongruent
[as in experiment 3, Petkova and Ehrsson (2008), and most of the
RHI experiments].
In a recent review, Blanke (2012) has proposed that the
changes in self-identification occurring during an OBE could cor-
respond to changes in the size and position of the visual RFs of
visuotactile trunk-centered neurons in VIP. Under the effect of
synchronous back-stroking, these RFs would extend far enough
to encode the fake body that comes to be part of the participant’s
peripersonal space (Maravita and Iriki, 2004). An additional
subpopulation of trimodal neurons integrating visuotactle and
vestibular signals would instead be responsible for changes in self-
location and visual perspective. Taken together, the basic model
we propose here for the full body ownership illusion and the
model proposed for OBEs in Blanke (2012), would provide an
evidence for the two types of full body illusions to be different
perceptual illusions with different underlying patterns of neural
activation.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of our study was to identify the main perceptual cues
underlying the full body ownership illusion and to determine
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their role and mutual interaction in the elicitation of the illusion.
We have selectively manipulated visuotactile and visual sensori-
motor stimulation, visual perspective, and the appearance of the
virtual body.
We have found that having a first person perspective is an
essential condition for experiencing the sense of ownership over
the virtual body. When 1PP is provided over a realistic vir-
tual body with a high degree of spatial overlap with the real
body, the sole effect of congruent visuoproprioceptive cues can
provide a sufficient condition for the illusion. In this condi-
tion, the additional contribution of congruent visuotactile and/or
sensorimotor stimulation is indeed not necessary. Nonetheless,
when the degree of spatial overlap (between the real and vir-
tual body) and/or of the visual realism (of the fake body) is
not high, congruent multisensory and/or sensorimotor cues are
needed to trigger the illusion. In this case, such multimodal cues
can be effective in both boosting the illusion, when congruent,
and in suppressing it, when incongruent. We furthermore found
that, when a high level of illusion is achieved by the synergic
merging of various components, incongruent cues can be pro-
cessed without breaking the illusion and can be perceived as not
incorrect.
We discussed these findings showing that they are consis-
tent with most of the previous results on part- and full-body
ownership illusions. Motivated by a number of findings from
neurophysiological recordings in the macaque monkey, we fur-
ther propose a speculative basicmodel for the full body ownership
illusion that accounts for most of the published results.
The present work advances our understanding of the crit-
ical mechanisms involved in the full body ownership illusion
and provides useful implications for research in body-perception,
self-consciousness, and numerous virtual reality applications.
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